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ABSTRACT
Scholarly interest in EU ﬁnancial regulation and economic governance has
increased sharply over the last decade, but the literature on their politics
remains fragmented. We present a scoping literature review which
systematically locates and aggregates academic articles on their politics in ISI-
ranked journals between 1999 and 2016. We identify lacunas in this literature
by mapping its strands onto the EU political system. We then present a
system-level research agenda that focuses on the cycles of depoliticization
and politicization that strongly characterize the politics in these areas. Future
research must pay careful attention to the conditions, mechanisms and,
especially the venues that (dis)allow the linkage of societal politicization to
EU-level politics. This approach is deeply rooted in the speciﬁcs of the politics
of these policy areas, but also draws on the strengths of research in these
areas to increase its relevance for broader debates on the future of the EU itself.
KEYWORDS EU politics; ﬁnancial regulation; economic governance; systematic literature review
Introduction
A decade has passed since the European Union (EU) was hit by the most severe
economic crisis since the 1930s. Despite its labelling as a series of ‘ﬁnancial’ and
subsequent ‘economic’ and ‘sovereign debt’ crises, its causes were not solely
located in the economic domain: political and institutional causes have been
equally important (Iversen et al. 2016; Lane 2012; Scharpf 2015; Wilsher
2014). In the short-term, the crisis has also had signiﬁcant political conse-
quences, such as increased European integration in the areas of ﬁnancial regu-
lation and economic governance. The long-term consequences of the crisis may
prove even more profound as the EU’s current political volatility largely
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originates from the crisis period and has yet failed to recede (Baglioni and Hur-
relmann 2016; Börzel 2016; Hobolt and De Vries 2016; Leupold 2016).
But where the politics of EU ﬁnancial regulation (FR) and economic govern-
ance (EG) have colossal societal implications, a comprehensive research
agenda to guide academic research on these politics is missing. Moreover,
the bulk of these studies has been published after the onset of the crisis
and is scattered across academic ﬁelds and disciplines. In this light, we aim
to systematically identify, categorize and describe academic studies on the
politics of EU EG and FR. Our underlying rationale is twofold. First, we aim
to identify and aggregate the literatures on the politics of these two areas
of EU policy, with a focus on studies that have been published since the intro-
duction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. We pay explicit atten-
tion to the balance in scholarly interest between the ‘usual suspects’ of politics
on EG and FR, such as member state governments, the European Commission,
the European Central Bank (ECB), and speciﬁc-interest groups, and a broader
set of political actors and forces involved in EU politics, such as public opinion,
national parliaments and diﬀuse-interest groups. Secondly, we aim to identify
those knowledge gaps in our understanding of these politics that require
further scholarly attention. Our investigation covers both macroeconomic
governance and ﬁnancial services regulation due to the strong linkages
between these areas of policy and the ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crises in
which private debt was bailed out by public debt (Quaglia 2013).
Scope and methodology
We use ﬁnancial regulation (FR) to refer to the formal and informal laws, rules
and policies at the EU level that govern the conduct of actors in the ﬁnancial
sector and the ﬁnancial markets in which they operate. By economic govern-
ance (EG), we refer to the formal and informal laws, rules, policies and activi-
ties at the EU level aimed at ensuring the macroeconomic, ﬁscal and monetary
performance and sustainability of the EU and its individual member states.
This concerns the EU’s competences as set out in articles 119-133 TFEU,
including the day-to-day coordination of the ﬁscal and macroeconomic pol-
icies of its member states through the European Semester and EU monetary
policy (most notably EMU). It excludes other forms of economic policy such as
regulation of individual markets, competition regulation and expenditure
policy (including cohesion policy). Given the diﬃculty of deﬁning politics,
our approach is comprehensive: we include all studies concerning the
diﬀerent elements (e.g., actors, institutions and policies) and processes
within the wider political system underpinning these areas of EU policy.1
Despite the lack of scoping reviews in political science, this method is
extremely useful for the systematic exploration and identiﬁcation of a ﬁeld
of literature in political science (Dacombe 2017). Our systematic scoping
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review is guided by the PRISMA framework (Liberati et al. 2009), a framework
developed in the medical sciences to bolster the quality and transparency of
the review process and ensure replicability. This framework enables a sys-
tematic identiﬁcation and analysis of eligible studies. We focus our review
on positive (non-normative), peer-reviewed articles published in the Web of
Science database between 1999 and 2016. A complete description of the
review process, as well as a quantitative scoping exercise and brief analysis
with regard to the metadata and characteristics of our dataset, can be
found in the online appendix.
Figure 1 plots the number of studies published over time for both policy
areas. In our population of 138 eligible studies, we ﬁnd a very strong increase
in studies published across both policy areas since the crisis, both in absolute
and relative terms (as weighed against the total number of articles in the data-
base). An average of 1.6 studies (1.9 per million) is published in the ﬁrst ﬁve
years covered here, which increases signiﬁcantly to an average of 25.8 (18.9
per million) for 2012–2016.2 The crisis quickly becomes a central theme in
studies on both policy areas from 2011 onwards.
Qualitative scoping
To get a bird’s eye view of the full range of studies published on the politics of
EG and FR, we use our own adaptation of Easton’s (1965) conception of pol-
itical systems as a framework in which to position the reviewed studies. Our
adaptation splits Easton’s generic ‘political system’ into a supranational and
interstate component, to better reﬂect the multi-level governance structure
of the EU. This adaptation is displayed in Figure 2.
Inputs: demand and support
The surveyed literature identiﬁes two main sources of input for the political
system underlying FR and EG: public opinion and interest groups. Current
Figure 1. Absolute numbers of studies published by year.
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research has looked at public opinion as input in EG (but not as input in FR),
ﬁnding that citizen opinions on EG are distinctly diﬀerent from opinions on
European integration at large (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014): whereas support
for the latter has decreased during the crisis, citizens have remained generally
supportive of the former. Economic performance is also a key driver of discon-
tent with the EU, as better economic performance at the country-level leads to
lower levels of citizen support for EU EG. The crisis has altered this relation-
ship, however: whereas poor domestic economic performance was linked
to positive evaluations of EU institutions in EG before the crisis (Banducci
et al. 2003), citizens in Southern countries have since the crisis also blamed
EU institutions for being unresponsive (Torcal 2014).
Support for the Euro has remained largely stable throughout the crisis, and
ﬂuctuations in support are mostly shaped by the Euro’s perceived perform-
ance and citizens’ overall assessment of the merits of the EU (Banducci
et al. 2003; Deroose et al. 2007; Roth et al. 2016). Support for the Euro
inside the Eurozone has remained higher than outside it (Hobolt and Wratil
2015). Moreover, when citizens seek to blame the EU for poor economic per-
formance, they tend not to blame the single currency but its central adminis-
trator, the ECB (Roth et al. 2016). Finally, some studies have also found EG
capable of shaping domestic public discourse. Negative recommendations
given to member states by the EU have had signiﬁcant impact on national
news media discourse (Meyer 2004), although not univocally: ‘hard’ coordi-
nation (e.g., ﬁscal policy) attracts media attention, whereas ‘soft’ coordination
(e.g., employment policy) does not (Meyer 2005).
The second major source of input, interest groups, has been of interest to
scholars on both EG and FR from the outset (e.g., Constantelos 2004; Grossman
2004; Heinisch 2000), but the number of studies on interest group politics has
grown substantially since the crisis. Financial interest groups have been found
to have signiﬁcant inﬂuence over policy outputs, especially in cases which
involve highly technical regulation. Interest groups show less interest in
broader institutional questions, which are generally dominated by bureaucratic
Figure 2. The EU political system.
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preferences (Quaglia 2008). The crisis has also pushed EU FR towards stricter
regulation, indicating a temporal loss of ﬁnancial interest group inﬂuence
over regulatory outputs (Levitt 2012). However, despite the opportunity
created by the crisis and its public backlash against the ﬁnancial sector for
civil society organizations and reform-minded policy makers to push through
a more consumer-friendly agenda, the return of ‘quiet politics’ soon reinstated
the dominance of ﬁnancial industry groups (Kastner 2014). Moreover, venue
shopping and issue framing are key strategies for the maximization of
inﬂuence for interest groups (Eising et al. 2015; Young 2014).
Organizations advocating consumer and employee interests have been
less successful, however. European trade unions and social movements
struggle to ﬁnd ways to aﬀect EU policy, because the EU’s technocratic gov-
ernance structure makes it diﬃcult to politicize decision-making, and nationa-
lizes social conﬂicts (Erne 2015). The limited mobilization of voices outside of
the business community also further constrains the level of interest group
pluralism in ﬁnancial regulatory policy making (Pagliari and Young 2015).
The diversity of actors mobilizing to inﬂuence regulatory decisions is
greater when decision-making processes are open and inclusive, and when
regulatory issues are salient (Chalmers 2015).
The system: the interstate level
Decision-making on EG and FR has predominately been studied as an intergo-
vernmental process, and scholars have often instinctively focused on cases of
salient intergovernmental political conﬂict rather than day-to-day politics in
times of little political turmoil. Several studies have found that potential sol-
utions to the Eurozone crisis were diﬃcult to introduce due to diﬀering
national perspectives, incompatible national regulatory frameworks, and dis-
agreements about how the burdens of adjustment should be shared (e.g.,
Begg 2012; Kudrna 2012). These studies ﬁnd that diﬀerences in preferences
between member states are largely entrenched and stem from structural
and ideational diﬀerences anchored in national contexts, resulting in a
‘battle of the systems’ or ‘battle of ideas’ (Quaglia 2015; Quaglia et al. 2016).
In FR, Quaglia (2011a) notes the existence of coalitions of member states
with shared ‘systems’, which share institutionally-shaped economic interests
rooted in national varieties of ﬁnancial capitalism. Examples of such stable
preferences include a reluctance to transfer ﬁnancial regulatory powers to
the EU when domestic ﬁnancial markets are largely made up of foreign
banks (Spendzharova 2012), an opposition to high capital requirements for
banks in member states with less developed equity markets and greater
non-ﬁnancial company reliance on bank credit (Howarth and Quaglia 2013),
and a support for further banking supervision harmonization in countries
with low levels or foreign bank ownership and high internationalization of
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domestic banks (Spendzharova 2014). Moreover, the reform of third country
equivalence rules was largely problematized by the existence of diﬀerent
national regulatory paradigms−a ‘battle of ideas’, where British lawmakers
opposed a ‘market-making’ Franco-German set of equivalence rules
(Quaglia 2015). This divide largely coincides with a deeper rift between
member states whose ﬁnancial sectors beneﬁt from market liberalization
and member states who stress the undesirability of the US ﬁnancial model
for the EU (Quaglia et al. 2016). Schimmelfennig (2016) also shows how
initial structural diﬀerentiation can fuel further diﬀerentiated integration
nascent policy areas: spillover eﬀects forced Eurozone member states to par-
ticipate in the Banking Union, while non-Eurozone members, for which such
pressure were absent, were given the option to opt-in.
Similar structural diﬀerences dominate the bargaining process in EG, where
the crisis has increased the divide between the EU’s North and South, or its
creditor and debtor states (Bilbao-Ubillos 2014). Due to a growing distrust
between Northern and Southern member states, EMU has ended up as a
highly centralized policy regime where the creditor member states have
come to play a domineering role with regard to debtor member states (Fab-
brini 2016). Moreover, the dominance of certain member states, most notably
Germany, has signiﬁcantly shaped decision-making processes throughout the
crisis (Saurugger and Terpan 2016; Steinberg and Vermeiren 2016). Insti-
tutional pressures from the EU have pushed the political economies of
Southern European member states towards a (German-inspired) stability
oriented approach to macroeconomic policy and a (Anglo-Saxon-inspired)
market-friendly approach to the regulation of ﬁnancial services (Quaglia
2013; Van der Pijl et al. 2011). The dominant ideas that characterized EG
before the crisis, being austere government budgets and neoliberal market
regulation, have mostly survived the crisis and are still in place (Heinrich 2015).
Given these ﬁxed preference structures, intergovernmental bargaining is
often decided by government positions and strategies: governments can sig-
niﬁcantly inﬂuence EU policy outputs if they occupy more central positions in
a policy network, play a brokerage role or can mobilize a coherent coalition
(Christopoulos and Quaglia 2009; Saurugger and Terpan 2016). For example,
the UK has managed to steer an alliance with the Commission, other key
member states, industry and transnational interest groups to shape the Sol-
vency II directive in its favour (Quaglia 2011b). In other cases, deviant prefer-
ences can lead to isolation: Rasmussen (2016) ﬁnds that as the UK became
increasingly obstructive to EU crisis reforms, other member states had
already given up on getting the UK on board, and their diplomats were unwill-
ing to align themselves with the UK in order to prevent being seen as obstruc-
tive themselves.
A few studies have examined the linkages between domestic politics and
member state positions in the two-level game of EU politics. On low salience
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issues, interest groups have been successful in shaping national contributions
to EU FR (Quaglia 2008). Rising levels of salience in turn expose member state
strategies to the public. In such cases, Woll (2013) ﬁnds that government pos-
itions become increasingly diﬃcult to inﬂuence, and only those actors whose
positions easily map onto existing government strategies are taken into
account. Moreover, governments strategically interact with domestic actors:
James (2016) shows how UK regulators used a domestic opportunity structure
to portray themselves as both hawkish and dovish to diﬀerent stakeholders to
achieve their desired outcome (cf. Lynggaard 2013). Such two-level games
may also hamper eﬀective regulation, as governments must both compete
for ﬁnancial activity on an international stage and appease conﬂicting
demands of electorates and interest groups at the national level (Rixen
2013). In EG, Craig (2012) shows that the extra-legal TSCG came about after
the UK vetoed amendments to the Lisbon Treaty, which was a result of Camer-
on’s desire to appease the Eurosceptic wing of the Tory party.
The system: the supranational level
Supranational institutions are generally characterized as less powerful than
member states, but can be extremely signiﬁcant in speciﬁc stages of the
reform process. EU institutions have been dominant as agenda-setters and
policy entrepreneurs (Copeland and James 2014; De Rynck 2016; Niemann
and Ioannou 2015; Quaglia 2007). The Banking Union, for example, has
been a recurrent policy proposal that has been on the Commission’s policy
agenda since the early 1960s (Mourlon-Druol 2016a). Despite failed attempts
to push the Banking Union shortly after the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis
(Kudrna 2012), the Commission later seized the opportunity created by the
ﬁnancial crisis to push through stricter EU regulations for bank regulation
and resolution.
EU institutions like the Commission and the ECJ also grant the necessary
credible commitment to the intergovernmental bargaining process during
the crisis, although their indirect legitimization often makes decisions made
at the EU level diﬃcult to justify to wider audiences (Fabbrini 2013). Bauer
and Becker (2014) observe that the crisis reforms have signiﬁcantly increased
the Commission’s competences, especially in the areas of policy implemen-
tation and enforcement. In response to Bauer and Becker (2014), Da Concei-
ção-Heldt (2016) observes that, compared to the delegation of powers to
the intergovernmental level and the ECB, the Commission’s relative role in
EG was subtly weakened instead.
Puetter (2012) illustrates how new modes of economic policy coordination
are more deliberative and intergovernmental in nature and prescribe a
greater role for the European Council in the supervisory process: it plays a
vital role as the intermediate institution between a supranational and
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intergovernmental mode of EG (Mourlon-Druol, 2016b). However, Bocquillon
and Dobbels (2014) also ﬁnd that, as the severity of the crisis increased, the
usually cooperative relationship between the Commission and the Council
in setting the agenda for the 2011 reform of the system of EG increasingly
shifted towards one characterized by a strong principal-agent dynamic. In a
similar vein, Bressanelli and Chelotti (2016) show that the European Council
has both the institutional resources and political legitimacy to shape the
policy agenda.
Radaelli and O’Connor (2009) have shown that the Council and the Com-
mission share a strong belief in legitimizing decisions on the basis of technical
expertise, despite the widely portrayed ‘political’ character of the Council (cf.
Wonka and Rittberger 2011). Rosamond (2015) ﬁnds that the European Com-
mission has throughout history always had a circular relationship with econ-
omic theory: it has both drawn on and contributed to theories of European
economic integration. The Commission’s policy documents have also
become increasingly enthusiastic about economic liberalization over the
past half century (Andrews 2013). Others have instead stressed the role of
experimental learning in EG, based on a framework of supranational goalset-
ting, national discretionary implementation and intergovernmental reﬂection
(Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Zeitlin 2016).
A relatively large share of scholarship has studied an institution that has tra-
ditionally had a limited role in FR and EG: the European Parliament. Scholars
have indicated that despite the limited capability of the EP to aggregate
public preferences into substantive policy outputs, it has successfully
steered EU policy towards a broader set of interests by using its normative
power. Especially in the area of EG where its competences are few, it relies
on normative pressure to compensate for the lack of bargaining resources
(Lord 2003; O’Keeﬀe et al. 2016; Rittberger 2014). In ﬁnancial governance, it
has been able to use this pressure to steer policy outputs away from
speciﬁc business interest towards more diﬀuse societal interests (Greenwood
and Roederer-Rynning 2015). The ECB has sought to beneﬁt from the norma-
tive power wielded by the EP; as it resorted to unconventional monetary
measures during the crisis, it has attempted to legitimize doing ‘whatever it
takes’ by actively seeking to be held accountable by the EP through bilateral
monetary dialogues (Collignon and Diessner 2016; Torres 2013). However,
Cooper (2016) observes that national parliaments also play, collectively and
alongside the EP, an increasingly important role in the oversight of the activi-
ties of the EU.
Output: laws and policy
Turning to the literature on the outputs in FR and EG, core debates involve the
balance between economic and other objectives, desired levels of national
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and supranational discretion and the lack of legitimacy of outputs of EU gov-
ernance. In the ﬁrst, a number of scholars have voiced concerns over the bias
towards austerity and market deregulation (Bieling 2006; Holman 2004).
Scharpf (2010) notes that a bias towards deregulation in EG has led to a dimin-
ishing of national institutions and policy legacies of the welfare state against
the pressures of economic competition, despite an absolute growth in redis-
tributive functions at the EU level (Caporaso et al. 2015). Others note that the
procedural simpliﬁcation introduced by the European Semester has
reinforced an existing bias towards the liberalization of market regulation in
the EU (Bieling et al. 2016; Seikel 2016), partly as the agreement of market-cor-
recting regulation is hampered by the high majority thresholds of the Com-
munity Method. Accordingly, Azzopardi-Muscat et al. (2015) ﬁnd that
Country-Speciﬁc Recommendations on healthcare expenditure are increas-
ingly framed towards the sustainability of public ﬁnances, as opposed to
social inclusion and policy sustainability. Moschella (2016) ﬁnds that actors
in favour of the neoliberal status quo, such as the ECB and Commission,
manage to preserve it by layering new rules into the Eurozone framework
which insulate it from changing political and market environments.
In terms of discretion in EG, scholars have consistently pointed out that the
non-binding rules have failed to ‘bite’ and have left too much leeway to the
actors involved (Amtenbrink and De Haan 2003). The dominant policy coordi-
nation mechanisms before the crisis, such as the Open Method of Coordi-
nation, provided the necessary ﬂexibility to tailor policy to national needs.
Yet this diversity was also their greatest weakness, as they allowed member
states to avoid compliance (Hodson and Maher 2001). The crisis painstakingly
showed that even rules-based governance mechanisms with Treaty-based
systems of enforcement failed to provide enough incentives to avoid struc-
tural deﬁcits and economic imbalances (Armstrong 2013; Deroose et al.
2008). Post-crisis reforms sought to reinforce the strength of the framework,
but their impact has been limited. As Eurozone members are reluctant to
give up their economic sovereignty by agreeing to more stringent economic
and ﬁscal oversight mechanisms at the supranational level, the system of EG is
stuck in a mode of ‘failing forward’ (Jones et al. 2016): a cycle where settling on
a lowest common denominator leads to incomplete governance frameworks,
a crisis, and new lowest common denominator solutions (Featherstone 2011;
Mourlon-Druol 2014; cf. Kudrna 2016a for FR). Thus, the burden of providing
the stability of the common currency has now come to lie with the ECB and its
monetary interventions (Adamski 2016; Wilsher 2014).
Some authors speciﬁcally point to the Commission and its supranational
discretion as a reason for the lack of enforcement (e.g., Armstrong 2013): sanc-
tions in the European Semester are decided upon by a politically accountable
executive, rather than by ‘traditional’ judicial enforcement. Such supranational
executive discretion, wielded by the Commission, was bolstered through the
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introduction of Reversed Qualiﬁed Majority Voting in the Excessive Deﬁcit Pro-
cedure, granting it near-autonomous executive competence in the area of
economic and ﬁscal governance (Seikel 2016). The Commission will thus
bargain with some member states, whereas it relies on a mechanistic appli-
cation of procedures with others (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016). Yet such
mechanistic application itself may also be undesirable, as it overlooks contex-
tual details and favours liberal and pro-market interests over others (Saurug-
ger 2016a; Somek 2015; White 2015). Still, Commission discretion is also not
the only source of political tinkering at the EU level, as national executives
themselves possess enough discretion to bend rules in their favour (Guiriato
et al. 2016; McPhilemy 2014).
A third issue raised by the literature on outputs concerns the lack of legiti-
macy of the crisis reforms. Once they are negotiated, these technocratic rules
are often forced upon citizens and presented as having no alternatives (Mar-
kantonatou 2012). While many Euro crisis solutions, for example, have major
political consequences for member states, the dominant views among
decision-makers are that they should not be politicized (Leino and Salminen
2013). Looking speciﬁcally at the Greek case, Featherstone (2016) points to the
tension between externally imposed conditionality and national democratic
choice, with the added diﬃculty that the domestic institutions tasked with
implementing reforms lack the capacity and experience to do so (cf. Garcia-
Arias et al. 2013). Moreover, in cases where the crisis made further integration
through conventional legislative routes diﬃcult, extra-EU legal steps were
taken to speed up the introduction of crisis measures. Examples include the
Fiscal Compact, the European Stability Mechanism and the Memorandums
of Understanding between the Troika and debtor states, which outline the
conditionality of ﬁnancial assistance to member states in need (Armstrong
2013). However, such intergovernmental crisis measures are in turn more poli-
ticized than supranational measures, as member state parliaments have a
more direct say on these matters (Wonka 2016).
A lack of legitimacy is also a concern in FR. Given the clout of ﬁnancial
service industry groups in the policy formulation process, FR lacks wider
input legitimacy and the reliance on non-binding regulations in certain
areas also jeopardizes their output legitimacy as this entails a larger risk of
noncompliance by regulatees (Iglesias-Rodriguez 2012). Governance
reforms have improved procedural eﬀectiveness by empowering industry
related experts, and the inclusion of EU institutions and civil society to the
decision-making processes remain largely formal (Kudrna 2016b). Another
reading of the EU’s attempts to curtail the crisis is that politicians have tried
to solve incomplete integration with more integration in both policy areas,
which has caused public backlash at domestic level (Saurugger 2016a; Van
Middelaar 2016). Such politicization of European integration then makes
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pushing further integration as a crisis solution more diﬃcult, creating a circu-
lar feedback loop (Saurugger 2016b).
Research agenda: the politics of (de-)politicization and venue
choice
Having aggregated all eligible studies on the politics of EU EG and FR, we
now turn to avenues for future research. We ﬁrst brieﬂy summarize our
ﬁndings and comment on the gaps that emerged when we mapped
these literatures onto the individual components of our conception of
the EU political system. We subsequently present a system-level research
agenda that transcends these individual components and informs systema-
tic research on the linkages between diﬀerent elements of the EU political
system.
Inputs have mostly been studied concerning EG and in the form of special
interest group inﬂuence and public opinion. No studies in our sample deal
with public opinion on issues of FR, despite the widespread public outrage
against the ﬁnancial system during the crisis. Moreover, only with reference
to interest groups have inputs been linked explicitly to other elements of
our conception of the EU political system. Aside from the occasional inference,
no studies in our sample have systematically linked other forms of input, such
as public opinion or domestic election outcomes, to EU actors, institutions, or
outputs in either policy area, or vice versa.
Studies on the interstate level have emphasized the structural rifts between
member states, characterized as ‘battles of systems’ and ‘battles of ideas’
(Quaglia 2011a, 2015), and the bargaining strategies that decide outputs. It
has portrayed member state governments as strategic actors that play the
domestic political ﬁeld by sending diﬀerent signals to diﬀerent domestic
actors. However, systematic examination of how member state governments
act as linking pins that connect politics at the domestic level to politics at the
EU level is needed.
Studies on the supranational level of the political system paint a picture of
increasingly powerful supranational institutions, such as the Commission and
the ECB, that oﬀer credible commitment to the integration process but remain
insulated in technocratic decision-making structures. A surprisingly substan-
tial portion of research has focused on the EP as a potential source of legiti-
macy and counterweight to business interests. Still, few studies have linked
the behaviour of these supranational actors to domestic politics, either as
dependent or independent variables. While the focus on the EP points to a
potential link with a wider public, the politicization of supranational actors
such as the Commission and ECB has not yet been studied in the areas of
EG and FR; this may oﬀer valuable insights into the responsiveness of these
seemingly insulated and technocratic actors.
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Finally, studies on outputs highlight an inherent bias towards deregulation
and austerity. They oﬀer two takes on the debate on enforcement: a lack of
compliance by national governments puts economies at risk, but mechanistic
application of supranational rules overlooks important contextual details.
Legitimacy for outputs is missing; rules are too technocratic, reﬂect a bias
towards business interests over societal interests and the politicization of
these outputs is considered undesirable. However, outputs are not systemati-
cally linked back to inputs, and as such much remains unknown about how
changes in EU policy outputs aﬀect the behaviour of interest groups, public
opinion and domestic election outcomes.
Moving beyond the individual components of our heuristic model, we
argue the ﬁeld would beneﬁt from a system-level research agenda that trans-
cends individual components and informs systematic research on the linkages
between components. As we will argue below, such an approach needs to
place at its core the processes of depoliticization and politicization that, as
our review has indicated, strongly characterize the politics of EG and FR. By
politicization, we refer to those processes that raise the salience of, polarize
(public) opinion on, and expand the actors and audiences engaged in moni-
toring EG or FR (cf. De Wilde et al. 2016). By depoliticization we refer to those
processes that lower this salience, decrease these levels of contestation, and
narrow these actors and audiences.
Processes of depoliticization are part and parcel of the EU, especially in the
policy areas examined here. Interest groups representing business interests
have an interest to keep regulatory issues out of the public eye, as public
attention limits their lobbying eﬀorts. Member states seeking credible com-
mitment delegate competences to non-majoritarian supranational insti-
tutions. These supranational actors, such as the Commission and ECB, in
turn use science and expertise to legitimize their activities and present
major distributive issues as regulatory ones. Consequently, such technocratic
legitimation yields outputs that are presented as having no alternatives, i.e., as
not pertaining to the realm of politics. Moreover, Mario Draghi’s ‘whatever it
takes’ is a clear-cut example by which a supranational actor sought to, aside
from calming ﬁnancial markets, depoliticize a raging political conﬂict and
create scope conditions for member states to ﬁnd common solutions to the
crisis.
In turn, processes of politicization shape political outputs as they interrupt
the low salience, business as usual politics of the EU. Policy outputs more
closely resonate with outsider voices, such as public opinion and societal
interest groups, when issues are more salient and contested. Deﬁant
member state governments and domestic-level actors, including Eurosceptic
political parties, have managed to cripple economic and ﬁnancial integration
by politicizing issues. Supranational actors have altered their behaviour when
faced with higher levels of politicization during the crisis, and have actively
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engaged in issue framing. Nowhere were these processes of politicization
more obvious than during the darkest hours of the Greek crisis, where a refer-
endum on Greek bailout conditions called by Alexis Tsipras politicized the
issues of austerity, democratic choice and European solidarity to a level unob-
served before in the EU.
These ﬁelds oﬀer the perfect cases to study these processes more gener-
ally: depoliticization is a core driver behind the existence of these EU policy
areas, while the crisis has politicized these ﬁelds to an extent that has lastingly
shaped the political future of the EU. Thus, they represent policy areas which
have undergone one of the largest swings in levels of salience and contesta-
tion in the history of the EU. By focusing mainly on the highly salient episodes
of crisis politics, these streams of literature have not suﬃciently covered these
processes. As absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, future research
should more explicitly hypothesize both the drivers and consequences of poli-
ticization, as well as depoliticization, in these areas. Especially now that the
crisis has receded and publics have lost interest, there is signiﬁcant scope
for studies on the return of quiet politics to EG and FR.
With such a research agenda, the key questions become those on the con-
ditions, mechanisms and agency of (de-)politicization: what is (de-)politicized
by who, when, where, how and why? Which issues are debated in media
outlets, and which aren’t? Which (constellations of) actors seek to politicize
issues, and which actors actively work to depoliticize them? When are
issues politicized, and how do these conditions compare to the conditions
of politicization in other policy areas? What means are used in the (de-)politi-
cization of issues, and how eﬀective are they? Why do actors politicize one
issue over another, and why do strategies of depoliticization work better for
some issues over others? Are policy outputs politicized by domestic actors,
and if so, where? And how do these strategies of politicization and depolitici-
zation interact and with what eﬀect for the characteristic multi-level politics of
EG and FR?
An especially valuable question to an agenda on the politics of (de-)politi-
cization is the question of location. The EU political system oﬀers actors
various venues, or arenas where decisions are taken, through which (de-)poli-
ticization can be achieved. Each of these venues has diﬀerent norms and rules,
and the authority and power of speciﬁc actors varies by the venue chosen.
Issue framing shapes venue choice (which in turn impacts issue framing),
and outputs have diﬀerent legal qualities, depending on the venue where
they were produced. Lastly, venue choice determines who wins and who
loses, as it enables certain actors to avoid blame and claim credit while dis-
abling others to do the same.
The crisis has oﬀered us a few clear-cut examples of the importance of
venue choice. Special interest groups, which draw on diﬀerent types and
quantities of resources compared to societal interest groups, have temporarily
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lost the power to unilaterally dictate their lobbying strategies as they were
abruptly forced to appear in the highly-visible venues that they would nor-
mally eschew. Eurosceptics sought to politicize ﬁscal solidarity at the domestic
level, whereas Europhiles sought to depoliticize crisis measures by choosing
EU-level venues. National parliaments have enjoyed an unprecedented level
of inﬂuence on the day-to-day cycles of EU politics. EU institutions have
chosen to engage in public debates on some issues, but have refrained
from doing so on others. Member state governments have chosen to push
reform measures in various venues: most strikingly, whereas the Six- and
Two-pack and Banking Union were negotiated through the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure, opposition by some member states lead to the establishment
of the EFSF and Fiscal Compact outside the EU legal framework.
A comprehensive research line on the politics of (de-)politicization and
venue choice in EG and FR can make important contributions to the
broader debates on European integration. While depoliticization and politi-
cization are key ingredients in neofunctional and postfunctional theories of
European integration respectively (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2009; Niemann
and Ioannou 2015), neither theory fully captures both politicization and
depoliticization, or the cyclical relationship between the two (Börzel and
Risse 2018). Integration through depoliticization does not necessarily
result in a more coherent polity, but may actually lead to a more fragmen-
ted Union (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016). Politicization, in turn, does
not necessarily imply a brake on integration, as the Eurocrisis has shown
(Börzel and Risse 2018). Importantly, our aim is not to provide a new
theory on European integration or to compete with existing ones. We
merely argue that a focus on (de-)politicization in EG and FR, and the inter-
action between the two, will provide valuable input to these debates, and
will help explain broader questions from ‘patchwork integration’ to the
resurgence of populism across the continent (e.g., Kriesi and Pappas
2015; Schimmelfennig 2016).
We must note that some recent studies published after our cut-oﬀ point
have already moved in this direction. In FR for example, Burns et al. (2018)
have looked the consequences of venue shopping and veto players for
reform processes, and Keller (2018) has examined the conditions under
which business interest groups politicize issues to increase their inﬂuence
on regulation. Van der Veer and Haverland (2018) have shown that the Com-
mission issues more extensive recommendations to member states that
experience greater politicization of European integration. While we strongly
welcome this development, these studies are few, do not yet speak to each
other, and do not yet represent a coherent and systematic research line.
The agenda presented here should help create such coherence, and help
the ﬁeld increase its relevance for the broader discussion on the future of
the EU.
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Notes
1. However, we only look at the internal politics of the EU−not at the EU’s role in
global aﬀairs.
2. The database has over 90 million records on more than 2500 disciplines.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research under
grant number 406.16.570.
ORCID
Reinout Arthur van der Veer http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8296-0499
Markus Haverland http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2205-6609
References
Includes all eligible studies included in the review. Articles cited here are identiﬁed by an
asterisk.
*Adamski, D. (2016) ‘Economic policy coordination as a game involving economic stab-
ility and national sovereignty’, European Law Journal 22(2): 180–203.
*Amtenbrink, F. and De Haan, J. (2003) ‘Economic governance in the European Union –
ﬁscal policy discipline versus ﬂexibility’, Common Market Law Review 40: 1057–106.
*Andrews, D. (2013) ‘Merged into one: keystones of European economic governance,
1962-2012’, Journal of European Integration 35(3): 315–31.
*Armstrong, K.A. (2013) ‘The new governance of EU ﬁscal discipline’, European Law
Review 38(5): 601–17.
*Azzopardi-Muscat, N., Clemens, T., Stoner, D. and Brand, H. (2015) ‘EU country speciﬁc
recommendations for health systems in the European semester process: trends, dis-
course and predictors’, Health Policy 119: 375–83.
*Baglioni, S. and Hurrelmann, A. (2016) ‘The eurozone crisis and citizen engagement in
EU aﬀairs’, West European Politics 39(1): 104–24.
*Banducci, S.A., Karp, J.A. and Loedel, P.H. (2003) ‘The Euro, economic interests and
multi-level governance: examining support for the common currency’, European
Journal of Political Research 42: 685–703.
*Bauer, M.W. and Becker, S. (2014) ‘The unexpected winner of the crisis: the European
Commission’s strengthened role in economic governance’, Journal of European
Integration 36(3): 213–29.
*Begg, I. (2012) ‘The EU’s response to the global ﬁnancial crisis and sovereign debt
crisis: economic governance under stress?’, Asia Europe Journal 9: 107–24.
Benediktsdottir, S., Danielsson, J. and Zoega, G. (2011) ‘Lessons from a collapse of a
ﬁnancial system’, Economic Policy 26(66): 183–235.
*Bieling, H. (2006) ‘EMU, ﬁnancial integration and global economic governance’, Review
of International Political Economy 13(3): 420–48.
Bieling, H. (2014) ‘Shattered expectations: the defeat of European ambitions of global
ﬁnancial reform’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(3): 346–66.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 15
*Bieling, H., Jäger, J. and Ryner, M. (2016) ‘Regulation theory and the political economy
of the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(1): 53–69.
*Bilbao-Ubillos, J. (2014) ‘The failure of European governance of the crisis’, European
Review 22(3): 361–81.
Birch, K. and Mykhneno, V. (2014) ‘Lisbonizing versus ﬁnancializing Europe? The Lisbon
Agenda and the (un)making of the European knowledge-based economy’,
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 32: 108–28.
Blom-Hansen, J. (2011) ‘Interests, instruments and institutional preferences in the EU
comitology system: the 2006 comitology reform’, European Law Review 17(3): 344–65.
*Bocquillon, P. and Dobbels, M. (2014) ‘An elephant on the 13th ﬂoor of the
Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda
setting’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(1): 20–38.
Bonefeld, W. (2015) ‘European economic constitution and the transformation of
democracy: on class and the state of law’, European Journal of International
Relations 21(4): 867–86.
Borras, S. and Radaelli, C.M. (2011) ‘The politics of governance architectures: creation,
change and eﬀects of the EU Lisbon strategy’, Journal of European Public Policy 18(4):
463–84.
*Börzel, T.A. (2016) ‘From EU governance of crisis to crisis of EU governance: regulatory
failure, redistributive conﬂict and eurosceptic publics’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 54: 8–31.
*Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T. (2018) ‘From the Euro to the Shengen crisis: European inte-
gration theories, politicization, and identity politics’, Journal of European Public
Policy 25(1): 83–108.
*Bressanelli, E. and Chelotti, N. (2016) ‘The shadow of the European Council. under-
standing legislation on economic governance’, Journal of European Integration 38
(5): 511–25.
*Burns, C., Clifton, J. and Quaglia, L. (2018) ‘Explaining policy change in the EU: ﬁnancial
reform after the crisis’, Journal of European Public Policy 25(5): 728–46.
*Caporaso, J.A., Kim, M., Durrett, W.N. and Wesley, R.B. (2015) ‘Still a regulatory state?
The European Union and the ﬁnancial crisis’, Journal of European Public Policy 22
(7): 889–907.
*Chalmers, A.W. (2015) ‘Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regu-
lation in Europe’, European Journal of Political Research 54: 482–501.
Chamon,M. (2014) ‘Theempowermentof agencies under theMeroniDoctrine andArticle
114 TFEU: comment on United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (Short-selling) and
the proposed single resolution mechanism’, European Law Review 39(3): 380–403.
*Christopoulos, D.C. and Quaglia, L. (2009) ‘Network constraints in EU banking regu-
lation: the capital Requirements Directive’, Journal of Public Policy 29(2): 179–200.
Cohen, B.J. (2007) ‘Enlargement and the international role of the Euro’, Review of
International Political Economy 14(5): 746–73.
*Collignon, S. and Diessner, S. (2016) ‘The ECB’s monetary dialogue with the European
Parliament: eﬃciency and accountability during the Euro crisis?’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 54(6): 1296–312.
*Constantelos, J. (2004). The Europeanization of interest group politics in Italy: business
associations in Rome and the regions’, Journal of European Public Policy 11(6): 1020–40.
*Cooper, I. (2016) ‘The politicization of interparliamentary relations in the EU: construct-
ing and contesting the “Article 13 Conference” on economic governance’,
Comparative European Politics 14(2): 196–214.
16 R. A. VAN DER VEER AND M. HAVERLAND
*Copeland, P. and James, S. (2014) ‘Policy windows, ambiguity and commission entre-
preneurship: explaining the relaunch of the European Union’s economic reform
agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(1): 1–19.
*Craig, P. (2012) ‘The stability, coordination and governance treaty: principle, politics
and pragmatism’, European Law Review 3: 231–43.
*Dacombe, R. (2017) ‘Systematic reviews in political science: what can the approach con-
tribute to political research?’, Political Studies Review (Advanced Online Access).
*Da Conceição-Heldt, E. (2016) ‘Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected
winner” of the Euro crisis: a comment on Bauer and Becker’, Journal of European
Integration 38(1): 95–100.
Dehousse, R. (2016) ‘Has the European Union moved towards soft governance?’,
Comparative European Politics 14: 20–35.
*Deroose, S., Hodson, D. and Kuhlmann, J. (2007) ‘Legitimation of EMU: lessons from the
early years of the Euro’, Review of International Political Economy 14(5): 800–19.
*Deroose, S., Hodson, D. and Kuhlmann, J. (2008) ‘The broad economic guidelines:
before and after the re-launch of the Lisbon strategy’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 46(4): 827–48.
*De Rynck, S. (2016) ‘Banking on a union: the politics of changing eurozone banking
supervision’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(1): 119–35.
De Wilde, P., Leupold, A. and Schmidtke, H. (2016) ‘Introduction: the diﬀerentiated poli-
ticisation of European governance’, West European Politics 39(1): 3–22.
*Dunlop, C.A. and Radaelli, C.M. (2016) ‘Policy learning in the eurozone crisis: modes,
power and functionality’, Policy Sciences 46(1): 107–34.
Dyson, K. (2009) ‘The evolving timescapes of European economic governance: contest-
ing and using time’, Journal of European Public Policy 16(2): 286–306.
*Easton, D. (1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York: Wiley.
*Eising, R., Rasch, D. and Rozbicka, P. (2015) ‘Institutions, policies and arguments:
context and strategy in EU policy framing’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(4):
516–33.
Epstein, R.A. and Rhodes, M. (2016) ‘The political dynamics behind Europe’s new
banking union’, West European Politics 39(3): 415–37.
*Erne, R. (2015) ‘A supranational regime that nationalizes social conﬂict: explaning
European Trade Unions’ diﬃculties in politicizing European economic governance’,
Labor History 56(3): 345–68.
*Fabbrini, S. (2013) ‘Intergovernmentalism and its limits: assessing the European
Union’s answer to the Euro crisis’, Comparative Political Studies 46(9): 1003–29.
*Fabbrini, S. (2016) ‘From consensus to domination: the intergovernmental union in a
crisis situation’, Journal of European Integration 38(5): 587–99.
*Featherstone, K. (2011) ‘The Greek sovereign debt crisis and EMU: a failing state in a
skewed regime’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49(2): 193–217.
*Featherstone, K. (2016) ‘Conditionality, democracy and institutional weakness: the
Euro-crisis trilemma’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54: 48–64.
Featherstone, K. (2005) ‘“Soft” co-ordination meets “hard” politics: the European Union
and pension reform in Greece’, Journal of European Public Policy 12(4): 733–50.
Ferran, E. (2011) ‘After the crisis: the regulation of hedge funds and private equity in the
EU’, European Business Organization Law Review 12:379–414.
Fligstein, N. and Sweet, A.S. (2002) ‘Constructing policies and markets: an institutional-
ist account of European integration’, American Journal of Sociology 107(5): 1206–43.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 17
*Garcia-Arias, J., Fernandez-Huerga, E. and Salvador, A. (2013) ‘European periphery
crises, international ﬁnancial markets, and democracy’, American Journal of
Economics and Sociology 72(4): 826–50.
*Gavras, P. (2010) ‘Regulatory abdication as public policy: government failure and the
real conﬂicts of interest of credit rating agencies’, Southeast European and Black Sea
Studies 10(4): 475–88.
*Genschel, P. and Jachtenfuchs, M. (2016) ‘More integration, less federation: the
European integration of core state powers’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(1):
42–59.
*Giuriato, L., Cepparulo, A. and Barberi, M. (2016) ‘Fiscal forecasts and political systems:
a legislative budgeting perspective’, Public Policy 168: 1–22.
*Greenwood, J. and Roederer-Rynning, C. (2015) ‘The “Europeanization” of the basel
process: ﬁnancial harmonization between globalization and parliamentarization’,
Regulation & Governance 9: 325–38.
*Grossman, E. (2004) ‘Bringing politics back in: rethinking the role of economic interest
groups in European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 11(4): 637–54.
*Heinisch, R. (2000) ‘Coping with economic integration: corporatist strategies in
Germany and Austria in the 1990s’, West European Politics 23(3): 67–96.
*Heinrich, M. (2015) ‘EU governance in crisis: a cultural political economy perspective
on European crisis management 2007-2014’, Comparative European Politics 13(6):
682–706.
*Hobolt, S.B. and De Vries, C.E. (2016) ‘Public support for European integration’, Annual
Review of Political Science, 19: 413–32.
*Hobolt, S.B. and Wratil, C. (2015) ‘Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of
support for the Euro’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(2): 238–56.
Hodson, D. (2009) ‘Reforming EU economic governance: A view from (and on) the prin-
cipal-agent approach’, Comparative European Politics 7(4): 455–475. doi:10.1057/cep.
2008.46
*Hodson, D. and Maher, I. (2001) ‘The open method as a new mode of governance: the
case of soft economic policy co-ordination’, Journal of Common Market Studies 39(4):
719–46.
*Holman, O. (2004) ‘Asymmetrical regulation and multidimensional governance in the
European Union’, Review of International Political Economy 11(4): 714–35.
Holmes, C. (2014) ‘“Whatever it takes”, Polanyian perspectives on the eurozone crisis
and the gold standard’, Economy and Society 43(4): 582–602.
*Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration:
from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’, British Journal of Political
Science 39: 1–23.
*Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L. (2013) ‘Banking on stability: the political economy of new
capital requirements in the European Union’, Journal of European Integration 35(3):
333–46.
*Iglesias-Rodriguez, P. (2012) ‘The regulation of cross-border clearing and settlement in
the European Union from a legitimacy perspective’, European Business Organization
Law Review (13): 441–74.
*Iversen, T., Soskice, D. and Hope, D. (2016) ‘The eurozone and political economic insti-
tutions’, Annual Review of Political Science 19: 163–85.
*James, S. (2016) ‘The domestic politics of ﬁnancial regulation: informal ratiﬁcation games
and the EU capital requirements directive’, New Political Economy 21(2): 187–203.
18 R. A. VAN DER VEER AND M. HAVERLAND
*Jones, E., Kelemen, R.D. and Meunier, S. (2016) ‘Failing forward? The Euro crisis and the
incomplete nature of European integration’, Comparative Political Studies 49(7):
1010–34.
*Kastner, L. (2014) ‘“Much ado about nothing?” Transnational civil society, consumer
protection and ﬁnancial regulatory reform’, Review of International Political
Economy 21(6): 1313–45.
*Keller, E. (2018) ‘Noisy business politics: lobbying strategies and business inﬂuence
after the ﬁnancial crisis’, Journal of European Public Policy 25(3): 287–306.
Kreuder-Sonnen, C. and Zangl, B. (2015) ‘Which post-Westphalia? International organ-
izations between constitutionalism and authoritarianism’, European Journal of
International Relations 21(3): 568–94.
*Kriesi, H. and Pappas, T.S. (2015) European Populism in the Shadow of the Great
Recession, Colchester: ECPR Press.
Kruck, A. (2016) ‘Resilient blunderers: credit rating ﬁascos and rating agencies’ institutio-
nalized status as private authorities’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(5): 753–70.
*Kudrna, Z. (2012) ‘Cross-border resolution of failed banks in the European Union after
the crisis: business as usual’, Journal of Common Market Studies 50(2): 283–99.
*Kudrna, Z. (2016a) ‘Financial market regulation: crisis-induced supranationalization’,
Journal of European Integration 38(3): 251–64.
*Kudrna, Z. (2016b) ‘Governing the EU ﬁnancial markets’, Comparative European Politics
14(1): 71–88.
*Kuhn, T. and Stoeckel, F. (2014) ‘When European integration becomes costly: the Euro
crisis and public support for European economic governance’, Journal of European
Public Policy 21(4): 624–41.
*Lane, P.R. (2012) ‘The European sovereign debt crisis’, Journal of Economic Perspectives
26(3): 49–67.
*Leino, P. and Salminen, J. (2013) ‘The Euro crisis and its constitutional consequences
for Finland: is there room for national politics in EU decision-making?’, European
Constitutional Law Review 9: 451–79.
*Leupold, A. (2016) ‘A structural approach to politicisation in the Euro crisis’, West
European Politics 39(1): 84–103.
*Levitt, M. (2012) ‘The city and EMU’, International Aﬀairs 88(6): 1261–75.
*Liberati, A. et al. (2009) ‘The PRISMA Statement for reporting systematic reviews and
meta-analyses of studies that evaluate health care interventions: explanation and
elaboration’, Annals of Internal Medicine 151(4): W65–94.
*Lord, C. (2003) ‘The European Parliament in the economic governance of the
European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2): 249–67.
*Lynggaard, K. (2013) ‘Elite decision makers’ strategic use of European integration and
globalisation discourses: Irish and Danish banking sector reforms in the 1990s and
2000s’, New Political Economy 18(6): 862–84.
Mamadouh, V.D. and van der Wusten, H.H. (2013) ‘The European Union in the grip of
accumulated governance crises: the Euro, the reform eﬀorts, and the public-support
dynamics’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 54(2): 162–81.
Mansbach, R.W. and Pirro, E.B. (2016) ‘Putting the pieces together: international and EU
institutions after the economic crisis’, Global Governance 22: 99–115.
*Markantonatou, M. (2012) ‘The state and modes of regulation in Greece from the post-
war period to the 2009 ﬁnancial crisis’, Journal f Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14
(4): 416–32.
*McPhilemy, S. (2014) ‘Integrating rules, disintegrating markets: the end of national dis-
cretion in European banking?’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(10): 1473–90.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 19
*Meyer, C.O. (2004) ‘The hard side of soft policy co-ordination in emu: the impact of
peer pressure on publicized opinion in the cases of Germany and Ireland’, Journal
of European Public Policy 11(5): 814–31.
*Meyer, C.O. (2005) ‘The Europeanization of media discourse: a study of quality press
coverage of economic policy co-ordination since Amsterdam’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 43(1): 121–48.
Mongelli, F.P., Dorrucci, E., Ioannou, D. and Terzi, A. (2015) ‘Responses to the Euro area
crisis: measuring the path of European institutional integration’, Journal of European
Integration 37(7): 769–86.
*Moschella, M. (2016) ‘Negotiating Greece. layering, insulation, and the design of
adjustment programs in the eurozopne’, Review of International Political Economy
23(5): 799–824.
*Mourlon-Druol, E. (2014) ‘Don’t blame the Euro: historical reﬂections on the roots of
the eurozone crisis’, West European Politics 37(6): 1282–96.
*Mourlon-Druol, E. (2016a) ‘Banking union in historical perspective: the initiative of the
European Commission in the 1960s–1970s’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(4):
913–27.
*Mourlon-Druol, E. (2016b) ‘Steering Europe: explaining the rise of the European
Council, 1975-1986’, Contemporary European History 25(3): 409–37.
Mugge, D. (2011) ‘The political economy of Europeanized ﬁnancial regulation’, Journal
of European Public Policy 20(3): 458–70.
Newman, A. and Bach, D. (2014) ‘The European Union as hardening agent: soft law and
the diﬀusion of global ﬁnancial regulation’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(3):
420–52.
Newman, A. and Posner, E. (2016) ‘Transnational feedback, soft law, and preferences in
global ﬁnancial regulation’, Review of International Political Economy 23(1): 123–52.
*Niemann, A. and Ioannou, D. (2015) ‘European economic integration in times of crisis:
a case of neofunctionalism?’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(2): 196–218.
*O’Keeﬀe, M., Salines, M. and Wieczorek, M. (2016) ‘The European Parliament’s strategy
in EU economic and ﬁnancial reform’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(2): 217–35.
Olsson, E.K. and Hammarhard, K. (2016) ‘The rhetoric of the President of the European
Commission: charismatic leader or neutral mediator?’ Journal of European Public
Policy 23(4): 550–70.
Orenstein, M.A. (2008) ‘Out-liberalizing the EU: pension privatization in Central and
Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 15(6): 899–917.
*Pagliari, S. and Young, K. (2015) ‘The interest group ecology of ﬁnancial regulation:
interest group plurality in the design of ﬁnancial regulatory policies’, Socio-
Economic Review 14(2): 309–37.
*Puetter, U. (2012) ‘Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the council
and European Council in EU economic governance’, Journal of European Public Policy
19(2): 161–78.
Puetter, U. (2007) ‘Intervening from outside: the role of EU ﬁnance ministers in the con-
stitutional politics’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(8): 1293–310.
*Quaglia, L. (2007) ‘The politics of ﬁnancial services regulation and supervision reform
in the European Union’, European Journal of Political Research 46: 269–90.
*Quaglia, L. (2008) ‘Setting the pace? private ﬁnancial interests and European ﬁnancial
market integration’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10(1): 46–63.
*Quaglia, L. (2011a) ‘The “old” and “new” political economy of hedge fund regulation in
the European Union’, West European Politics 34(4): 665–82.
20 R. A. VAN DER VEER AND M. HAVERLAND
*Quaglia, L. (2011b) ‘The politics of insurance regulation and supervision reform in the
European Union’, Comparative European Politics 9: 100–22.
*Quaglia, L. (2013) ‘Financial regulation and supervision in the European Union after
the crisis’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform 16(1): 17–30.
*Quaglia, L. (2015) ‘The politics of “third country equivalence” in post-crisis ﬁnancial
services regulation in the European Union’, West European Politics 38(1): 167–84.
Quaglia, L. (2012) ‘The “old” and “new” politics of ﬁnancial services regulation in the
European Union’, New Political Economy 17(4): 515–35.
Quaglia, L. (2013) ‘The Europeanization of macroeconomic policies in ﬁnancial regu-
lation in Italy’, South European Society and Politics 18(2): 159–76.
*Quaglia, L., Howarth D. and Liebe, M. (2016) ‘The political economy of European
capital markets union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54: 185–203.
*Radaelli, C.M. and O’Connor, K. (2009) ‘How bureaucratic elites imagine Europe:
towards confergence of governance beliefs?’, Journal of European Public Policy 16
(7): 971–89.
*Rasmussen, M.K. (2016) ‘“Heavy fog in the channel. Continent cut oﬀ”? British diplo-
matic relations in Brussels after 2010’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3):
709–24.
*Rittberger, B. (2014) ‘Integration without representation? The European Parliament
and the reform of economic governance in the EU’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 52(6): 1174–83.
*Rixen, T. (2013) ‘Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: shadow banking, oﬀshore
ﬁnancial centres, and jurisdictional competition’, Regulation & Governance 7: 435–59.
*Rosamond, B. (2015) ‘Performing theory/theorizing performance in emergent supra-
national governance: the “live” knowledge archive of European integration and
the early European Commission’, Journal of European Integration 37(2): 175–91.
*Roth, F., Jonung, L. and Nowak-Lehmann, D. (2016) ‘Crisis and public support for the
Euro: 1990-2014’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(4): 944–60.
*Saurugger, S. (2016a) ‘Politicisation and integration through law: whither integration
theory?’, West European Politics 39(5): 933–52.
*Saurugger, S. (2016b) ‘Sociological approaches to the European Union in times of
turmoil’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(1): 70–86.
Saurugger, S. (2014) ‘Europeanisation in times of crisis’, Political Studies Review 12: 181–92.
*Saurugger, S. and Terpan, F. (2016) ‘Resisting “new modes of governance”: an agency-
centred approach’, Comparative European Politics 14(1): 53–70.
*Scharpf, F.W. (2010) ‘The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be
a “social market economy”’, Socio-Economic Review 8(2): 211–50.
*Scharpf, F.W. (2015) ‘After the crash: a perspective on multilevel European democracy’,
European Law Journal 21(3): 384–405.
*Schimmelfennig, F. (2016) ‘A diﬀerentiated leap forward: spillover, path-dependency,
and graded membership in European banking regulation’, West European Politics 39
(3): 483–502.
Schwarzer, D. (2012) ‘The Euro area crises, shifting power relations and institutional
change in the European union’, Global Policy 3(1): 28–41. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.
12013
*Seikel, D. (2016) ‘Flexible austerity and supranational autonomy. The reformed exces-
sive deﬁcit procedure and the asymmetry between liberalization and social regu-
lation in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(6): 1398–416.
*Somek, A. (2015) ‘Delegation and authority: authoritarian liberalism today’, European
Law Journal 21(3): 340–60.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 21
*Spendzharova, A.B. (2012) ‘Is more “Brussels” the solution? New European Union
member states’ preferences about the European ﬁnancial architecture’, Journal of
Common Market Studies 50(2): 315–34.
*Spendzharova, A.B. (2014) ‘Banking union under construction: the impact of foreign
ownership and domestic bank internationalization on European Union member-
states’ regulatory preferences in banking supervision’, Review of International
Political Economy 21(4): 949–79.
*Steinberg, F. and Vermeiren, M. (2016) ‘Germany’s institutional power and the EMU
regime after the crisis: towards a Germanized Euro area?’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 54(2): 388–407.
Thatcher, M. (2011) ‘The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits: a com-
parative analysis of European delegation’, Journal of European Public Policy 18(6):
790–809.
*Torcal, M. (2014) ‘The decline of political trust in Spain and Portugal: economic
performance or political responsiveness’, American Behavioural Scientist 58(12):
1542–67.
*Torres, F. (2013) ‘The EMU’s legitimacy and the ECB as a strategic political player in the
crisis context’, Journal of European Integration 35(3): 287–300.
*Van der Pijl, K, Holman, O and Raviv, O. (2011) ‘The resurgence of German capital in
Europe: EU integration and the restructuring of Atlantic networks of interlocking
directorates after 1991’, Review of International Political Economy 18(3): 384–408.
*Van der Veer, R.A. and Haverland, M. (2018) ‘Bread and butter or bread and circuses:
politicisation and the European Commission in the European semester’, European
Union Politics 1–22.
*Van Middelaar, L. (2016) ‘The return of politics – the European Union after the crises in
the eurozone and Ukraine’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(3): 495–507.
Verdun, A. (2013) ‘Small states and the global economic crisis: an assessment’, European
Political Science 12: 276–93.
Wasserfallen, F. (2014) ‘Political and economic integration in the EU: the case of failed
tax harmonization’, Journal of Common Market Studies 52(2): 420–35.
*White, J. (2015) ‘Authority after emergency rule’, Modern Law Review 78(4): 585–610.
*Wilsher, D. (2014) ‘Law and the ﬁnancial crisis: searching for Europe’s new gold stan-
dard’, European Law Journal 20(2): 241–83.
Winecoﬀ, W.K. (2014) ‘Bank regulation, macroeconomic management, and monetary
incentives in OECD economies’, International Studies Quarterly 58: 448–61.
*Woll, C. (2013) ‘Lobbying under pressure: the eﬀect of salience on European Union
hedge fund regulation’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(3): 555–72.
*Wonka, A. (2016) ‘The party politics of the Euro crisis in the German Bundestag:
frames, positions and salience’, West European Politics 39(1): 125–44.
*Wonka, A. and Rittberger, B. (2011) ‘Perspectives on EU governance: an empirical
assessment of the political attitudes of EU agency professionals’, Journal of
European Public Policy 18(6): 888–908.
*Young, K. (2014) ‘Losing abroad but winning at home: European ﬁnancial industry
groups in global ﬁnancial governance since the crisis’, Journal of European Public
Policy 21(3): 367–88.
Zahariadis, N. (2012) ‘Complexity, coupling and policy eﬀectiveness: the European
response to the Greek sovereign debt crisis’, Journal of Public Policy 32(2): 99–116.
*Zeitlin, J. (2016) ‘EU experimentalist governance in times of crisis’, West European
Politics 39(5): 1073–94.
22 R. A. VAN DER VEER AND M. HAVERLAND
